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ABSTRACT
This chapter from The Year in Review, published by the ABA Section on Environment,
Energy and Resources, covers developments during 2013 in the areas of standing, Commerce
Clause, political question doctrine, preemption, takings, due process, First Amendment, Tenth
Amendment, and state constitutional law.

Chapter 28 • CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
2013 Annual Report1
Key decisions at the intersection of constitutional law and environmental, energy,
and natural resources law in 2013 occurred in the areas of standing, Commerce Clause,
political question doctrine, preemption, takings, due process, First Amendment, Tenth
Amendment, and state constitutional law.
I.

STANDING

Plaintiffs must prove (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability in order
to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution.2 Plaintiffs generally must also
satisfy requirements of prudential standing, including the requirement that they allege an
injury that falls within the zone of interest of the relevant statute.
In Texas v. EPA, Texas, Wyoming, and industry groups sought review of
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decisions implementing the Clean Air Act’s
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) framework for greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from stationary sources.3 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petitions, holding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing. That holding was based on the court’s interpretation of
Clean Air Act section 165 that requires new and modified major sources of air pollution
to secure a pre-construction permit and incorporate the “best available control technology
[BACT] for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter.”4 The court held that
section 165 is “self-executing,” meaning that once EPA regulated GHG emissions from
cars and trucks, the Act itself imposed technology and permitting requirements absent
any regulatory action. Because the petitioners were injured by section 165, and not EPA’s
rules, the court held that the petitioners lacked standing. In reaching its decision, the court
rejected an argument that the two states had standing because of the “special solicitude”
owed to them under Massachusetts v. EPA.5 The court suggested that states receive such
solicitude only when they seek to enforce a federal statute, rather than impede its
application. Moreover, the court explained, notwithstanding any “special solicitude,”
states must identify “a concrete and particularized injury in fact.”6 On October 15, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case.7
The Ninth Circuit also considered standing in the context of climate change in
Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon.8 In that case, environmental organizations
1
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sued Washington environmental agencies alleging that those agencies failed to implement
technology based standards to control GHG emissions at the state’s five refineries. The
Ninth Circuit, assuming without deciding that members of the environmental groups had
adequately established injury-in-fact by identifying climate-related harms to their
recreational and aesthetic interests, held that plaintiffs lacked standing on causation and
redressability grounds. The court rejected as “conclusory,” the environmental groups’
claim that the state agencies failure to regulate “caused” their injury because regulation
would have reduced emissions from the refineries. The court suggested that establishing a
“causal nexus” between specific sources and climate injuries is “particularly challenging”
because “there is a natural disjunction between Plaintiffs’ localized injuries and the
greenhouse effect.” For those same reasons, the court held that plaintiffs’ could not
demonstrate redressability. The court distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, explaining that plaintiffs’ could not avail themselves of a relaxed
standing standard because they were private parties and not states. The court also
explained that plaintiffs could not even meet the standard for causation provided by
Massachusetts because the amount of GHGs emitted by the refineries was too small to
constitute a “meaningful contribution” to climate change.9
The Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit each issued important opinions
addressing probabilistic injury. In NRDC v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit found there was
standing where an environmental group challenged a conditional registration for
pesticides containing small particles of silver—referred to by the name AGS-20—for
application to textiles and clothes as an anti-microbial chemical, and alleged that the
children of its members would be exposed to it.10 In so doing, the court did not address
the likelihood that exposure to AGS-20 would result in adverse health consequences.
Instead, it treated the risk of exposure as an adequate injury and held that NRDC had
standing because it had demonstrated a “‘credible threat’ that a probabilistic harm will
materialize.”11
The Second Circuit took a similar approach in NRDC v. FDA.12 In that case, an
environmental group challenged FDA’s regulation of two chemicals, triclosan and
triclocarban, both used in antiseptic soap. NRDC proffered an affidavit from a member
that came into contact with triclosan in the workplace and identified evidence that
triclosan can harm human health. The court held that this established injury-in-fact,
notwithstanding significant uncertainty about whether and to what extent triclosan is
harmful. The court explained that “the injury contemplated by exposure to a potentially
harmful product is not the future harm that the exposure risks causing, but the present
exposure to the risk.” Because NRDC demonstrated a “credible threat” of harm to its
member’s health by showing that triclosan may be harmful, and the FDA could not
determine that it is safe, NRDC adequately demonstrated injury. The court also rejected
arguments by the government that NRDC failed to establish causation because its
members could purchase non-triclosan antibacterial soap for themselves and bring that
soap to work, or could try to persuade their employer to provide such soap. The court
explained that the cost of purchasing an alternative soap product would itself constitute
injury and that “the failure to take affirmative action to advocate with an employer does
not render the exposure to triclosan at the hands of the employer ‘self-inflicted’ so as to
defeat standing.” The court took a different view of NRDC’s allegations regarding
triclocarban. NRDC alleged that approval and subsequent use of triclocarbon could lead
9
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to antibiotic-resistant bacteria that could infect its members. The court held that
allegation too “contingent and far-off” to constitute injury-in-fact.13
Two courts also issued important decisions about the zone-of-interest component
of prudential standing. In Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held
that one industry petitioner lacked prudential standing to challenge new EPA air
standards for certain lead smelters as insufficiently stringent.14 The petitioner asserted
only an interest in increasing regulation on its competitors, and the court held that interest
fell outside the zone of interest of the Clean Air Act. The court explained that, although
the government did not raise prudential standing, it resolved the issue because the D.C.
Circuit treats prudential standing as jurisdictional.15 Judge Silberman concurred to
respond to a recent dissent in another case that had argued that prudential standing is not
jurisdictional. Judge Silberman suggested that even if certain prudential standing
doctrines lack a jurisdictional character, the zone of interest test is properly understood as
a matter of statutory standing and that questions of statutory standing are jurisdictional.16
In Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell, the Ninth Circuit held that an environmental
group lacked prudential standing to challenge the Fish and Wildlife Service’s operation
of a fish hatchery as allegedly in violation of the Reclamation Act.17 The relevant section
of the Reclamation Act requires that federal reclamation projects comply with state water
law.18 The Wild Fish Conservancy alleged that diverting water to operate the hatchery
violated Washington water law because the Fish and Wildlife Service had not secured a
permit for the diversion from the Washington Department of Ecology and, therefore, the
hatchery violated the Reclamation Act. The court explained that Washington water law
does not permit citizen suits, but rather, entrusts enforcement to the state government.
Because the purpose of the Reclamation Act is to respect state sovereignty, the
Conservancy fell outside of its zone of interest when it attempted to use federal law as a
means of enforcing a provision of state law for which the state vested exclusive
enforcement authority in a state agency.19
II.

COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress
shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” 20 In its
positive form the Commerce Clause is the source of constitutional authority underlying
most federal environmental laws. In its negative or “dormant” form it prevents states
from adopting protectionist laws that erect barriers to interstate commerce or attempt to
control commerce beyond the state's borders.
When the Supreme Court declined to uphold under the Commerce Power the
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate to buy health insurance,21 it inspired analogous
challenges to environmental statutes.22 In Voggenthaler v. Maryland Square, LLC the
13
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Ninth Circuit rejected such a challenge to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).23 In that case, the State of Nevada sued
under CERCLA to require the owners and operators of a shopping mall to pay for
cleaning up groundwater contaminated by discharges of dry cleaning fluids. The
defendants argued that CERCLA could not constitutionally apply to this site because the
affected groundwater is not in interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit held that
groundwater is an article in interstate commerce and both the dry cleaning business and
the remediation of the site are in and affect interstate commerce.24
Regarding the dormant Commerce Clause, in Tarrant Regional Water District v.
Herrmann the Supreme Court denied a claim by a Texas water district that an Oklahoma
law limiting water extraction licenses to Oklahoma residents was unconstitutional. 25 The
Court held that because the Red River Compact allocates all of the water in the watershed
to the participating states, Oklahoma’s refusal to let Texas extract water in Oklahoma
implements a federally authorized water management scheme and does not impermissibly
interfere with interstate commerce.
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey the Ninth Circuit upheld California's
Fuel Standard against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. 26 The Fuel Standard
implements the transportation part of California's Global Warming Solutions Act,
regulating the carbon intensity of fuel blended and sold in California. The law sets
decreasing annual caps on carbon intensity of ethanol and crude oil and requires blenders
and producers to show that their fuels are under the limit.27 A blender or producer can
comply either by using the average carbon intensity for his region and production method
or by calculating the actual carbon intensity of his fuel. The rule specifies averages for
different methods of producing ethanol in three regions: California, the Midwest and
Brazil. The crude oil rule works in a similar manner, but all but one type of producer
must use the averages. 28
Because the rule groups the carbon intensity averages by region, plaintiffs
claimed that it was facially discriminatory and barred by the dormant Commerce Clause.
The district court agreed and enjoined the Fuel Standard, but the Ninth Circuit reversed
holding that the Fuel Standard discriminated among fuels based on their carbon intensity.
Location only affected two components of the calculation and sometimes favored
Midwest blenders over California companies. Thus, the fact that the rule used a state
boundary to group producers with similar characteristics did not render it facially
discriminatory. The court also rejected claims that the crude oil standard had a
discriminatory purpose or effect and that the Fuel Standard was an attempt to regulate
commerce outside of California.29 The court remanded the case to the district court to
consider whether the ethanol part of the Fuel Standard had a discriminatory purpose or
effect that would require strict scrutiny and if not to apply the balancing test set forth in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.30
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In Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin the Second Circuit held that
a dormant Commerce Clause claim was not ripe because the power purchase agreement
that the plaintiffs claimed would require them to sell power to Vermont utilities below the
market rates for other states had not yet been entered into.31 The court however expressed
grave doubts that such an agreement could pass muster under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
III.

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

Last year’s chapter noted that the Fifth Circuit would have an opportunity in 2013
to pass on the possible implications of American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut32 for
applying the political question doctrine to claims that climate change impacts constitute a
public nuisance under state law. In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA the court declined that
opportunity, ruling instead that the re-filed claims made by property owners that certain
power and chemical companies’ GHGs contributed to climate change, and that climate
change in turn exacerbated the harmful effects of Hurricane Katrina, were barred by res
judicata.33
One district court case bears noting. In Alaska v. Kerry, the State of Alaska sued
the U.S. Secretary of State and EPA, among others, challenging federal enforcement of
low-sulfur fuel requirements for marine vessels operating in certain coastal waters.34 The
Secretary implemented the requirements pursuant to the United States’ obligations as a
party to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, under
the authority granted him by the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships. The court applied
the multi-factor test established in Baker v. Carr35 and found the state’s claims nonjusticiable.
IV.

DISPLACEMENT AND PREEMPTION

The preemption doctrine relies on the principle that federal law is the “supreme
Law of the Land.”36 Preemption of state law by federal legislation can be either express
or implied. Express preemption derives from the explicit language of a statute.
Preemption may be implied where Congress completely occupies the subject field (field
preemption) or else when state law conflicts with federal law (conflict preemption).
In Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, discussed above, the Supreme
Court rejected a claim that the Red River Compact created cross-border rights for a Texas
water district that preempted Oklahoma water laws and held that the Compact’s silence
on the issue of preemption reflected an intention among the Compact’s drafters to respect
state borders.37 In construing the preemptive reach of the Compact, the Court was
persuaded by three factors: “the well-established principle that States do not easily cede
their sovereign powers, including their control over waters within their own territories;
the fact that other interstate water compacts have treated cross-border rights explicitly;
and the parties’ course of dealing.”38
31
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In American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court held
that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) expressly
preempts two contract provisions that the Port of Los Angeles sought to impose on
drayage trucking companies as part of the port’s Clean Air Action Plan.39 The provisions,
designed to help alleviate community and environmentalist opposition to the port’s
expansion, required any company providing drayage trucking services to a marine
terminal operator at the Port to develop an off-street parking plan and to display specified
placards on its vehicles.40 The FAAAA, however, provides that “a State [or local
government] may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with
respect to the transportation of property.”41 The Ninth Circuit had held that the contract
provisions do not have “the force and effect of law” because they reflect the Port’s
“business interest” and were “designed to address [a] specific proprietary problem,”
namely community opposition to the Port’s plans to increase shipping activity. 42 In a
unanimous opinion the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that because the Port
threatened to impose criminal penalties on marine terminal operators for a contracting
trucking company’s noncompliance the Port was operating in its regulatory capacity and
the provisions had the effect of law. Notably, the court also declined to address the
potential scope of the market participant exception to statutory preemption in this
context.43
The Courts of Appeal issued a number of opinions regarding the preemptive reach
of different parts of the Clean Air Act. In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the Third
Circuit held that the Clean Air Act did not preempt private property owners’ putative
class action tort law claims of nuisance, negligence, and trespass based on the settling of
a power plant’s flying ash and unburned coal combustion byproducts on private
property.44 The court, consistent with decisions from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits,
reasoned that the plain language of the Clean Air Act’s savings clause allows states to
impose stricter standards than the federal government and that citizens may seek
enforcement of any such state emission standard or limitation.45
In another case, the Second Circuit held that the Clean Air Act did not impliedly
preempt state tort law claims arising from the contamination of groundwater by the
organic chemical compound methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE).46 In affirming the
district court’s decision in the bellwether trial for consolidated multidistrict MTBE
litigation, the Second Circuit panel rejected the argument that, as a practical matter, the
Act required gasoline manufacturers to use MTBE to satisfy the Act’s federal oxygenate
requirement and therefore it would be impossible to comply with both the statute and
state common law. The court also rejected the argument that a tort remedy would pose an
obstacle to accomplishment of the Act’s objectives in establishing the Reformulated
Gasoline Program.47
39
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Finally, in Ass’n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas the Fifth Circuit
upheld an incentive program offering taxicabs utilizing compressed natural gas (CNG)
“head-of-the-line” privileges at Love Field, a municipally-owned airport, against a
preemption challenge.48 The court held that the program did not establish a “standard”
under the plain meaning of section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act. The court also held that
plaintiffs had failed to establish by record evidence that the indirect economic effects on
non-CNG taxi-owners were sufficiently “acute” to force them to either convert to CNG
or else abandon the business.
In Dominion Transmission Inc. v. Summers, a case about the preemptive reach of
the Natural Gas Act but with Clean Air Act implications, the D.C. Circuit held that state
law provisions demanding certification of a gas compressor station’s compliance with
local zoning and land use requirements, incorporated by reference into Maryland’s State
Implementation Plan and approved by EPA under the Clean Air Act, were saved from
preemption by section 3(d) of the Natural Gas Act.49
The Courts of Appeal also weighed in on the preemptive reach of several other
laws. In Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Village of Hobart, Wisconsin, the
Seventh Circuit held that federal Indian law preempted a Wisconsin village from
imposing stormwater management charges on parcels of land owned by the United States
in trust for the tribe.50 And in Waldburger v. CTS Corp. the Fourth Circuit held that the
discovery rule established by CERCLA extends to state statutes of repose, as well as state
statutes of limitation.51 In the case, a North Carolina law imposed a ten-year limitation on
the accrual of real property claims, without regard for the plaintiff's knowledge of harm.
Section 9658 of CERCLA, in contrast, establishes that all claims accrue on the date a
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known an injury was caused or contributed to
by a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant. The court reasoned that the
remedial purposes of the statute demanded a liberal construction of the discovery rule’s
applicability to state timing limitations.52
V.

FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE

The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken “for public
use, without just compensation.”53 There are two kinds of Fifth Amendment takings:
physical takings and regulatory takings. A physical taking occurs where there is a “direct
government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.”54 A regulatory taking
may occur where there is no physical taking but government action nonetheless “affect
and limit” the use of private property “to such an extent that a taking occurs.”55
The Supreme Court Term issued two takings decisions in 2013. In Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District,56 the Court weighed the argument that the
District’s request (or demand) for fee in lieu of mitigation to pay for one or the other of
two District projects constituted a taking or exorbitant exaction. A 5-4 majority extended
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,57 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,58 finding that
government exactions must bear an “essential nexus” and be roughly proportionate to the
impacts of the development that the exactions seek to mitigate. The majority and dissent
agreed to this point.59 They differed on the import of that analysis. The majority held that
a land use exaction fee that goes too far “confiscat[es] property” and may require just
compensation.60 The dissent argued that monetary exactions that go too far require refund
of overcharges, not a takings analysis.61
Horne v. Department of Agriculture62 determined that a federal court has
jurisdiction to hear a takings challenge to a United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) administrative order that imposed sanctions on alleged raisin handlers under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals to consider the Hornes’ Fifth Amendment claim that the USDA took their
private property by assessing them substantial penalties for refusing to donate a
substantial share of their raisin crop for various federal programs in part as a price
support mechanism. The Court rejected the federal government argument that the claim
was not ripe under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,
even though the Hornes refused to pay the fines.63
In Lost Tree Village v. United States,64 the Federal Circuit held that the “relevant
parcel” for a takings claim was only the platted parcel for which the developer sought a
section 404 dredge and fill permit from the Army Corps. The court refused to “extend
[the relevant parcel] to all of a landowner’s disparate holdings in the vicinity of the
regulated parcel.” The court concluded the determinative factor was whether the
developer treated other parcels as “part of the same economic unit.” Absent that, “the
mere fact that the properties are commonly owned and located in the same vicinity is an
insufficient basis on which to find they constitute a single parcel for purposes of the
takings analysis.”65
The Fourth Circuit took up two cases weeks apart that dealt with challenges to the
Town of Nags Head, North Carolina’s declaration that beachfront lands that encroached
on public trust lands were abatable public nuisances. In Town of Nags Head v.
Toloczko,66 the appellate court reversed the district court’s abstention under the Burford
doctrine.67 The appellate court noted that state and local land use and zoning are
“paradigm[atic]” Burford issues, particularly as applied to the state’s public trust doctrine
established pursuant to its Equal Footing rights, but distinguished the case, because North
Carolina law is settled that only the state may bring an action to enforce the state’s public
trust rights.68 While the public trust doctrine is an important, state-specific policy issue,
57
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the court emphasized that Burford abstention does not apply where the state law is
settled. Further, while Williamson69 would ordinarily bar the federal claim until state
courts deny just compensation, the appellate court waived ripeness and finality to avoid
piecemeal litigation.70 In Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head,71 the court upheld the lower
court’s refusal to abstain, holding that the town waived Williamson by removing the case
to federal court, thereby committing “procedural gamesmanship” of “forum
manipulation.”
VI.

DUE PROCESS

As in previous years, due process issues raised as claims72 or defenses73 in
environmental cases were generally unsuccessful. Again as in the past, due process issues
were one of many, and not the principal, arguments in a majority of environmental cases,
and thus courts tended to give cursory attention to them.74
Due process claims similarly failed where regulated parties claimed that they did
not have fair notice of regulations that governed them.75 In Wisconsin Resources
Protection Council v. Flambeau Mining Co.,76 however, in a Clean Water Act citizen suit
alleging that a mining company lacked a stormwater discharge permit, the Seventh
Circuit held that liability could not be established because the company lacked notice that
a permit issued by the state, which is EPA-approved to administer its own national
pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES) program, may be potentially invalid. In
so holding, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the permit shield available to NPDES
permit holders for compliance with such permits was also available to the mining
company.

69
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In another case where substantive due process claims featured more prominently
than usual for an environmental case, Hardesty v. Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality
Management District, a company regulated by multiple regulatory agencies survived
motions to dismiss based on allegations that government agencies acted with improper
motive after a competitor exerted influence on the agencies.77 The case is still pending,
with the due process claims not yet adjudged on the merits. The burden to prove that the
government was motivated not by legitimate regulatory interests but by illegitimate
reasons is “exceedingly high,”78 and thus whether it succeeds beyond the motion to
dismiss stage, where the allegations are accepted as true, remains to be seen. On the other
hand, Pioneer Aggregates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection,79 presenting similar issues of illegitimate interference with business rights,
did not survive a motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient allegations.
United States v. South Jersey Clothing Co.,80 presented a rather unique due
process issue. Landowners down-gradient of a Superfund site sought relief from a
consent decree incorporating settlement agreements between potentially responsible
parties and their insurers. Noting that the landowners did not have notice that their rights
might be cut off from releases that insurers were given in the settlement agreement, the
court held the consent decree not to bar the landowners’ claims against the insurers
should the state court determine that the landowners have a protectable interest.
VII.

FIRST AMENDMENT

In the past year, there have been no major doctrinal changes in First Amendment
jurisprudence as it relates to environmental, energy or natural resources issues. However,
readers should be aware of one case that will be decided in 2014: Sebelius v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc..81 Sebelius involves a challenge to the Affordable Care Act brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Court is
expected to decide whether corporations can have religious beliefs and, if so, whether
they are entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 82 If answered in the
affirmative, this may dramatically increase litigation brought under the First Amendment,
RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which
uses the same “substantial burden” standard as RFRA.
RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling
governmental interest.83 Because the statute is written with an intentionally broad scope,
it applies to all manner of land use and environmental regulations. A few representative
cases address the potential of this statute for breeding litigation in the field: In Eagle
Cove Camp & Conference Center, Inc. v. Town of Woodboro, Wisconsin the Seventh
Circuit turned aside a claim that land use regulations prohibiting a year-round Bible camp
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in a residential zone violated RLUIPA and the First Amendment. 84 The court found that
the regulations did not substantially burden the exercise of religion and were also
supported by a compelling state interest. In Washington v. Gonyea, the Second Circuit
held that RLUIPA does not provide a private cause of action against state officials in
their individual capacities.85 The law remains unsettled on this issue, although the
national trend seems to be to disallow private causes of action against individual actors.
This holding may limit the attractiveness of RLUIPA for many land use and
environmental disputes.
Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, Florida principally dealt
with the issue of ripeness in the First Amendment context.86 The plaintiff claimed that the
designation of its property as historic (which limited development) violated its rights
under RLUIPA. The Eleventh Circuit found that “the mere fact of its designation as a
historic landmark satisfy the fitness and hardship requirements of our traditional ripeness
jurisprudence.”
On the “free speech” side of the First Amendment, there are a few cases of
interest. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger is an outgrowth of multi-billion dollar litigation in
Ecuador concerning the alleged environmental depredations of Chevron.87 In this case,
environmentalists, journalists and bloggers moved to quash a subpoena directed to
Google and Yahoo claiming that their First Amendment speech and associational rights
would be infringed upon if the servers were required to disclose the identity of those
individuals. The court denied the relief finding that the First Amendment claims were
attenuated and indefinite.
The plaintiffs in Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service
claimed that the decision of the Forest Service and a ranger to reduce the number of
livestock grazing permits within a national forest was made in retaliation for their earlier
protests.88 The individual claims against the ranger were dismissed, but the court found
that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action for declaratory relief against the Forest Service
for future violations.
Finally, the 2012 Annual Report included a summary of a district court case
involving a floating buffer zone that prohibited protests by environmentalists around
vessels engaged in offshore drilling. That decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in
Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc..89 The court wryly observed that free speech was
not infringed because “Greenpeace USA has no audience at sea.”
VIII.

TENTH AMENDMENT

The Tenth Amendment provides that “. . . powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”90
In Texas v. EPA,91 Texas and Wyoming challenged several rules promulgated by
EPA that impose permitting requirements for GHGs under the PSD provisions of the
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Clean Air Act in states without implementation plans for GHGs as of January 2, 2011.
The States argued that the requirements constituted coercion and commandeering of the
organs of state government in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and analogized the
requirements to Congress’ threat to withhold all Medicaid funds from states in the
Affordable Care Act provision found unconstitutional under the Spending Clause in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.92 The D.C. Circuit upheld the
rules, finding that federal statutes that allow states to administer federal programs but
provide for direct federal administration if a state chooses not to do so have long been
held constitutional. Further, even if the new requirements forced a “significant”
temporary construction delay for new major emitting facilities the States had not
demonstrated such a delay was of the same magnitude and nature as the Medicaid
expansion provision, which would have stripped over 10% of a state’s overall budget.
Moreover, unlike the Medicaid provision, which threatened to “withhold all existing
Medicaid funds from [s]tates unwilling to carry out the expansion,” EPA assumed
authority over only the GHG emissions portion of the states’ PSD permitting programs.93
IX.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources,94 a Wisconsin Supreme Court majority opinion held that the public trust rights
of the State lay in lands below the ordinary high water line demarcating the boundary
between uplands and navigable, non-tidal waters. A dissenting opinion countered that the
public trust doctrine is not so “crabbed” by the common law boundaries.95 These two
opinions provide strong arguments against and for the position of Joseph Sax in his
landmark 1970 law review article that advocated expanding the public trust doctrine
beyond navigable waters for robust environmental and natural resources protections.96
In Democko v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources,97 the Iowa Supreme Court
held that distinctions between resident and nonresident landowners in state issued special
hunting licenses did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution. The court emphasized U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that the
Clause “protects nonresidents from discrimination only with respect to ‘fundamental’
privileges or immunities.”98 The court relied on Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of
Montana,99 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that recreational hunting is not a
fundamental privilege protected by the Constitution. While Baldwin addressed the right
of nonresidents to a state hunting license, Iowa statutes established the state’s “ownership
or title in trust, to conserve natural resources for the benefit of all Iowans.”100 The court
emphasized that “[t]he clear implication of this unqualified statute is that a landowner has
no title to or interest in wildlife [in] the state borders, even if the wildlife is on the
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landowner’s property.”101 The court concluded that this allowed the State to grant only
resident landowners the right to hunt certain wildlife on their lands without violating the
Constitution.102
In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania103 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court struck the controversial Act 13 that had virtually preempted oil and gas
regulation to the state, precluding local zoning of such uses. A three justice plurality held
that the Act violated the State Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment, which
states that the Commonwealth holds natural resources in a public trust. The plurality
seemed to hold that zoning implements a constitutionally stated public trust authority
where zoning protects the state’s natural resources. The fourth member of the majority
issued a concurring opinion stating that the statewide zoning standards violated
substantive due process.104 The dissenting justices contended that the majority violated
separation of powers, usurping the legislative fact finding and policy function, and failed
to observe the status of local municipalities as creatures of state statute, subordinate to the
state.105
In Agency of Natural Resources v. Perrons,106 the Vermont Supreme Court
rejected due process challenges to civil penalties for wetlands violations. The court held
that civil penalties met lower due process thresholds than did criminal action. While no
agency detailed the exact location of on-site wetlands, the defendants knew or should
have known substantial wetlands existed there. The court emphasized: “As a landowner
of protected wetlands, the onus is on him, individually, to ensure that he is conducting
permissible activities in permitted areas.”107
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